The mind, the lab, and the field: Three kinds of populations in scientific practice. by Winther, Rasmus Grønfeldt et al.
UC Berkeley
UC Berkeley Previously Published Works
Title
The mind, the lab, and the field: Three kinds of populations in scientific practice.
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/043364s0
Authors
Winther, Rasmus Grønfeldt
Giordano, Ryan
Edge, Michael D
et al.
Publication Date
2015-08-01
DOI
10.1016/j.shpsc.2015.01.009
 
Peer reviewed
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
lable at ScienceDirect
Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences xxx (2015) 1e10Contents lists avaiStudies in History and Philosophy of Biological and
Biomedical Sciences
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/shpscThe mind, the lab, and the field: Three kinds of populations
in scientific practice
Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther a,*, Ryan Giordano b, Michael D. Edge d, Rasmus Nielsen b,c
a Philosophy Department, UC, Santa Cruz, CA, USA
bDepartment of Statistics, UC, Berkeley, CA, USA
c Integrative Biology, UC, Berkeley, CA, USA
dDepartment of Biology, Stanford University, CA, USAa r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Available online xxx
Keywords:
Ecology
Models
Ontology
Population Genetics
Reification
Statistics* Corresponding author. Philosophy Department, 11
CA 95064, USA.
E-mail address: rgw@ucsc.edu (R.G. Winther).
URL: http://www.rgwinther.com
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2015.01.009
1369-8486/ 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Please cite this article in press as: Winther, R
in History and Philosophy of Biological anda b s t r a c t
Scientists use models to understand the natural world, and it is important not to conflate model and
nature. As an illustration, we distinguish three different kinds of populations in studies of ecology and
evolution: theoretical, laboratory, and natural populations, exemplified by the work of R. A. Fisher,
Thomas Park, and David Lack, respectively. Biologists are rightly concerned with all three types of
populations. We examine the interplay between these different kinds of populations, and their pertinent
models, in three examples: the notion of “effective” population size, the work of Thomas Park on Tri-
bolium populations, and model-based clustering algorithms such as Structure. Finally, we discuss ways to
move safely between three distinct population types while avoiding confusing models and reality.
 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical SciencesWhat are the relationships among the populations that bi-
ologists postulate in idealized theoretical models, the populations
they set up in experimental laboratories, and the populations they
survey and sample in the wild? We describe three qualitatively
different kinds of populations at the heart of distinct styles of sci-
entific practice in ecology and evolution, viz., theoretical, labora-
tory, and field investigations. Distinguishing three types of
populationsdtheoretical, laboratory, and naturaldprovides a useful
lens for viewing both past and contemporary work in ecology and
evolutionary biology.
Three examples illustrate the value of distinguishing theoretical,
laboratory, and natural populations: the concept of “effective”
population size, the work of Thomas Park on flour beetle pop-
ulations, and the use of model-based genetic clustering algorithms
such as Structure. In keeping with the “Genomics and Philosophy of
Race” theme of the special issue in which this article appears, our56 High St., UCSC, Santa Cruz,
. G., et al., The mind, the lab, a
Biomedical Sciences (2015), htrichotomy can assist analyses of the implications of genomic
studies for claims about the existence (or the non-existence) of
human races. In the conclusion, we suggest ways to avoid
conflating the three kinds of populations. Researchers can cycle
through natural, laboratory, and theoretical populations, express-
ing genuine interest in each population type. Theoretical, labora-
tory, and natural populations also pertain to fields beyond ecology
and evolution, including statistics.
We analyze scientific practice. Although questions regarding
realism and anti-realism, the concepteworld relation, and the
general ontology of science lurk, our trichotomy is not intended as a
rubric for determining how much a model does or does not corre-
spond to reality. Admittedly, an overarching aim of population
biology is to understand the complex structure and dynamics of
populations “in the wild.” Even so, the multiple ontologies of sci-
entific practice are complexdarguably there is a world in a theo-
reticalmodel (e.g.,Morgan, 2012) or in an experimental system (e.g.,
Leonelli, 2007). Second, this article does not provide a singular,
complete, and strict delimitation of the “population” concept. Other
classifications and analyses of the concept are compatible with our
view. We are pluralists about population concepts, about the kindsnd the field: Three kinds of populations in scientific practice, Studies
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2015.01.009
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and even about distinct classifications of populations (e.g.,
Earnshaw-Whyte, 2012; Matthen & Ariew, 2002; Stegenga, 2010).
Our analysis side-steps explorations of the metaphysics of sci-
ence and alternative classifications. We advocate “taking a look”
(Hacking, 2007, 36e38) at styles of practice of working biologists.
Which kinds of populations do biologists believe they are studying?
Which figures in the history of biology might shine through as
exemplars (Kuhn, 1970) of distinct styles of practice regarding
populations? Which tools allow biologists to avoid conflating
different kinds of populations and to perform important work
internally, within each style of practice?1. Three kinds of populations
Three kinds of populations used in the history and philosophy of
population genetics, population biology, and evolutionary ecology
can be distinguished: theoretical, laboratory, and natural.
1. Theoretical populations are groups of abstracted individuals (or
genes) whose properties and behaviors are studied in formal
models constructed with idealized assumptions.
2. Laboratory populations are collections of actual organismsdor
parts of organisms, such as cell linesdassembled in an experi-
mental setting.
3. Natural populations are collections of actual organisms living in
the wilddsettings that are not constructed expressly for
studying the organisms. (But researchers might modify the
habitat.)
Each of these kinds of populations is associatedwith its own kind of
models, methods, and ontologies. Each can also be enriched by
including stipulations about shared ancestry, proximity, or in-
teractions between population members, such as competition,
cooperation, or interbreeding. In practice, researchers may modify
their use of the term “population” to suit the questions they pursue,
which has two implications. First, elaborated definitions may not
capture all appropriate uses of the three “population” concepts. For
our purposes, only the minimal definitions in 1e3 above are
needed. Second, populations are not exactly identical with the set
of individual organisms composing them, whether in the mind or
theory, the lab, or the field. The researcher also imposes the concept
“population” onto organisms. Thus, although we describe the three
kinds of populations as types of collections of objects, they might
also be viewed as three distinct population conceptsdin this way,
laboratory and natural populations are also, in some sense, “theo-
retical.” Populations are abstractions evenwhen their members are
not. Differently put, scientists use the construct “population” to
select specific attributes in which they are interested. These fea-
tures are chosen because of particular goals, assumptions, and
practices scientists bring to their objects of study in three contexts:
the theorist’s mind, the experimenter’s labscape, and the field-
worker’s landscape (Kohler, 2002). Paraphrasing the biologist Jean
Rostand’s quip, “populations pass; the frogs remain.”
All three types of populations have received philosophical
attention. Morrison (2000, 2002) shows which assumptions and
idealizations were necessary to overcome conflicting notions of
theoretical populations in the BiometricianeMendelian debate in
the early 20th century.We takework by Ankeny and Leonelli (2011)
to be about laboratory populations, and contributions by Millstein1 In this issue, Millstein (2015) suggests that although her analysis of populations
“is in the spirit” of natural populations, her analysis could also be applied to lab-
oratory populations.
Please cite this article in press as: Winther, R. G., et al., The mind, the lab,
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lation has a rich history of use in biology and originated in its own
way (e.g., Kingsland, 1995; Kohler, 2002; Mitman, 1992). We side-
step these histories and focus on one exemplary student of each
kind of population: R. A. Fisher (theoretical), Thomas Park (labo-
ratory), and David Lack (natural).
1.1. Fisher on theoretical populations
In the preface to the first edition of The Genetical Theory of
Natural Selection, Fisher reflected on a remark by Arthur Eddington:
“We need scarcely add that the contemplation in natural science of
a wider domain than the actual leads to a far better understanding
of the actual” (Eddington, 1929, 266e267; Fisher, 1930 (1958), viii).
Fisher wholeheartedly agreed with Eddington. Fisher observed that
practical biologists may deem it ludicrous to “work out the detailed
consequences experienced by organisms having three or more
sexes,” but this is precisely what they should do if they “wish to
understand why the sexes are, in fact, always two” (Fisher, 1930
(1958), ix). Fisher recognized that:
ordinary mathematical procedure in dealing with any actual
problem is, after abstracting what are believed to be the
essential elements of the problem, to consider it as one of a
system of possibilities infinitely wider than the actual, the
essential relations of whichmay be apprehended by generalized
reasoning, and subsumed in general formulae, which may be
applied at will to any particular case considered. (Fisher, 1930
(1958), ix)
As Fisher understood, the creative power of mathematics lies
partially in its capacity for generality, abstraction, and idealization.
Very roughly, generality concerns the breadth of situations to
which a mathematical structure applies; abstraction relates to the
paucity of assumptions and axioms of the structure. The sparser the
set of assumptions and axioms under which a theorem is derived,
the more abstract it is (Cartwright, 1983). Idealization is reasoning
about representations that may not be physically realized, such as
infinitely long lines in geometry (e.g., Cartwright, 1989; Jones,
2005; Ohlsson & Lehtinen, 1997; Winther, 2014a). Mathematical
activity involves proofs and applications of general, abstract, and
idealized mathematical structures, deductively hitched (Hacking,
2014).
Fisher argued that certain properties of groups of organisms
could be understood without detailed knowledge about individual
organisms (Fisher & Stock, 1915). Specifically, Fisher considered the
effects of selection in the aggregate, “borrow[ing] an illustration
from the kinetic theory of gases” (Fisher & Stock, 1915, 60). Just as
the statistical physicist studies the behavior of idealized gas parti-
cles in a theoretical aggregate, Fisher studied the behavior of
abstracted and idealized organisms in a theoretical population, a
theoretical aggregate that was “independent of particular knowl-
edge about individuals” (Fisher & Stock, 1915, 61). In part through
analogizing gas laws and selection laws, Fisher constructed a novel
notion of population. Fisher’s analogy between physics and biology
was deliberate and ongoing (Edwards, 1994, 2014; Morrison, 2000,
2002). By 1918, Fisher assumed that a population consisted of many
“randomly mating” individuals,2 each of which contained many
independent genetic factors (Fisher, 1918, 401). In describing his
later fundamental theorem of natural selection (FTNS), Fisher
stipulated that “the [fundamental] theorem is exact only for2 We write “randomly mating” in quotes because the individuals in Fisher’s
populations are abstractions and do not literally mate, although they do join their
genetic factors randomly to give rise to the next generation.
and the field: Three kinds of populations in scientific practice, Studies
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ensure averaged behavior across individual particles, so the FTNS
ensures averaged behavior across individual organisms (1930
(1958), 39e40). As Morrison (2002, 64) notes: “The idealised na-
ture of the assumptions from that domain [statistical mechanics]
served as amethodological model or analogy onwhich he based his
own views about how to characterise a Mendelian population” (see
also Morrison, 2000, chap. 7). Indeed, despite certain differences
(e.g., the FTNS is not an irreversible law), both the second law of
thermodynamics and the fundamental theorem of natural selection
are properties of populations, or aggregates, true irrespective of
the nature of the units which compose them; both are statistical
laws; each requires the constant increase of a measurable
quantity. entropy of a physical system. [and] fitness. of a
biological population. (Fisher, 1930 (1958), 39)
Importantly, the biologyephysics analogy pertained more to
method than to content, involving particular mathematical ap-
proaches, approximations, and assumptions, especially the “aver-
aging strategy” of abstracting and averaging across the properties
and processes of individuals (the parts) to identify central ten-
dencies of the population (the whole) (Okasha, 2004; Sober &
Lewontin, 1982; Sterelny & Kitcher, 1988; Wade, 1992; Winther,
Wade, & Dimond, 2013).3 The FTNS and the analogy behind it
show that general, abstracted, and idealized theoretical pop-
ulations were Fisher’s object of study.
Later population-genetic theory has followed Fisher’s mathe-
matical method of generalization, abstraction, and idealization.4
Fisher’s construction of theoretical populations in biology may
also have informed the “population” concept he introduced to
statistics. We return to this possibility in the conclusion.
1.2. Park on laboratory populations
The work of ecologist, evolutionary biologist, and entomologist
Thomas Park illustrates the use of laboratory populations. Park
spent much of his career at the University of Chicago developing,
modifying, and observing the Tribolium flour beetle laboratory
system. We examine his remarkable paper co-authored with Jerzy
Neyman and Elizabeth Scott from the University of California,
Berkeley (Neyman, Park, & Scott, 1956). Respecting the difficulties
meeting the researcher studying “populations .in the field,”
Neyman, Park, and Scott suggest two kinds of models that could
substitute for fieldwork: “mathematical or laboratory-experimental”
(1956, 42). Both kinds of models “depict the workings of at least a
part of nature” and, moreover, “enhance the interaction of certain
factors” while diminishing or eliminating others (42). Most gener-
ally, both models are “abstractions of nature designed to illumine
natural phenomena” (43). Since we have already explored mathe-
matical theoretical populations, we set the first kind of model aside,
focusing on laboratory populations.
In the first of two parts of the paper, “Biological Aspects,”
written primarily by Park, “a laboratory-experimental model” is
characterized thus:
A population exhibiting a relatively rapid life cycle in a not too
artificial laboratory habitat; cultured under easily controlled, yet
manipulatory, environmental and trophic conditions; for which
repeated censuses of all stages can be taken with negligible3 There are various ways to understand the FTNS (e.g., Edwards, 1994, 2014;
Ewens, 2011; Frank & Slatkin, 1992; Okasha, 2008; Plutynski, 2006). However, the
power of Fisher’s overarching mathematical procedure is widely accepted.
4 Via his breeding experiments at Rothamsted Experimental Station (e.g., Fisher,
1937; see Wade, 1992; Winther et al., 2013).
Please cite this article in press as: Winther, R. G., et al., The mind, the lab, a
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(Neyman et al., 1956, 45)
This statement compresses a list of 10 characteristics that make a
laboratory system optimal “for study of population phenomena.”
Tribolium has many of the listed characteristics. Flour can easily be
sieved to bring forth eggs, larvae, pupae and adults, facilitating
censuses. Moreover, flour is simultaneously the “climactic,” trophic,
and spatial habitat, simplifying a potentially complex environment.
Finally, different Tribolium species can be mixed in the same flour,
enabling studies of interspecific behavior. Park used Tribolium to
study processes such as cannibalism, interference among in-
dividuals of the sameandofdifferent species, oviposition, predatore
prey interactions, and hosteparasite interactions (43) (Mitman,
1992; Winther, 2005). The influence of the Tribolium model con-
tinues through theworkof Park’s students, includingMontyB. Lloyd,
David B. Mertz, Michael R. Nathanson, and Michael J. Wade.
Neyman, Park, and Scott worry that their laboratory model will
be criticized as “artificial” (45). They accept that their model,
though not simple, is simplified (45e46), but they reject the
implication that artificial models are trivial. Laboratory populations
are abstract compared with natural populations: many features of
natural populations are eliminated in laboratory populations (e.g.,
rain, presence of predator species). Constructing a laboratory
population is also an idealization: a previously non-existent entity,
the laboratory population, is granted reality in the counter-
factualdor better yet, counternaturaldexperimental setting.
Finally, the authors believe their model to be general, citing Park’s
(1955) claim that the “unrealistic aspects” of laboratory models
“may be a virtue instead of a vice,” and that such models “can
contribute to the maturation of ecology, at least until. they are no
longer needed” (Neyman et al., 1956, 46). Simplified, abstract, ideal,
and general laboratory population models support some inferences
about natural populations, with the caveat that laboratory and
natural populations are not identical.
The position of laboratory populations between theoretical and
natural populations raises a question: Are laboratory populations
models of natural populations or are laboratory populations
themselves objects of further mechanistic or mathematical
models? Put differently, are they representations or targets of other
representations? Neyman, Park, and Scott think that laboratory
models can “accelerate the understanding of all populations” (45),
and represent, in many respects, natural populations. But they also
hold that a laboratory population is itself a target of mathematical
models (p. 59, ff.) and mechanistic models (Fig. 1, 48), as we
describe in Section 2.2 below. A laboratory population can also be a
model for another laboratory population, potentially even of other
species under distinct conditions.5 In short, laboratory populations
are both representation and target.
Laboratory populations could be further compared with other
“concrete models” such as “remnant models” in the museum
(Griesemer, 1990, 1991), “model organisms” (Ankeny & Leonelli,
2011) or “compositional models” (Winther, 2006b, 2011) in the
laboratory, and “scalemodels” in engineering (Weisberg, 2013). The
main lesson for us is that laboratory populations represent natural
populations imperfectly and serve as limited instantiations of
theoretical populations.1.3. Lack on natural populations
The ornithologist David Lack, known for studying Darwin’s
finches in detail, was an early evolutionary ecologist and a student5 We thank Roberta Millstein for this point.
nd the field: Three kinds of populations in scientific practice, Studies
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Fig. 1. Major components of the Tribolium model. From Neyman et al. (1956), 48.
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(1947)) of his influential Darwin’s Finches, he sketched the nature
of the book:
This is a work of natural history, based on a study of living birds
in the Galapagos and of dead specimens in museums. The evi-
dence is circumstantial, not experimental, so that theories must
be presented cautiously. They should not, however, be excluded.
(p. xiii)
By studying natural populations, including remnant models stored
in the museum (see Griesemer, 1990, 1991),6 Lack was able to
investigate plumage in the context of sexual selection, beak size
differences among finches on different islands, and hybridization.
Natural populations are the basic unit of Lack’s investigations.
Lack circumscribes his populations using features of the Galapagos
finches that interest him, viz., few competitors for food, few pred-
ators, and, crucially, “owing to geographical conditions,” division
into “a number of partly, but not completely, isolated populations,
some of which are of very small size” (Lack, 1945, 115e116). Lack
identifies natural populations using an important feature,
geographical isolation.
Lack’s units of study are natural populations, but similarly to our
two other exemplars, Fisher and Park, his investigations draw on
insights from other types of populations. Lack changed his theo-
retical interpretation but repeatedly referred to the same data from
natural populations found in the field or stored in the museum. For
example, in his earlier work, Lack (1945) hypothesized that most
variation across populations was non-adaptive, attributable to the
“Sewall Wright effect” (119, 135). By his 1947 book, in part due to
Julian Huxley’s influence, Lack’s views changed significantly. He
now postulated that interspecific competition fine-tuned the
variation among populations, and species, of Darwin’s finches.
Cross-population variationwas now understood as adaptive. Either
way, Lack abstracted the properties of individuals from natural
populations using data models including data tables, histograms,
and maps.
Peter and Rosemary Grant took Lack’s research program further,
studying repeated bouts of selection in natural populations of
Galapagos finches for over three decades. Discussing their precur-
sor, in a review of a subsequent book by Lack, Peter Grant (1977)
observed that “Lack himself was not a tester of ideas so much as
an explainer of observations and hence a generator of ideas” and
“Lack’s field work strategy was to be a generalist, sacrificing some6 We suggest that specimens in a museum are better thought of as samples,
potentially un-representative, of natural populations rather than as constructed
laboratory populations.
Please cite this article in press as: Winther, R. G., et al., The mind, the lab,
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on natural populations, adding new insights about evolutionary,
ecological, ethological, genetic, and physiological processes while
remaining close to populations in the wild (Grant & Grant, 1989;
Weiner 2014 (1994)).
Many others have investigated natural populations. Among
famous cases, consider the work by Theodosius Dobzhansky that
“took him into the field and caused him to abandon his beloved
Drosophila melanogaster, the standard fly, for a wild cousin, D.
pseudobscura,” and that inspired historian Robert Kohler towrite an
entire book on the lab-field cultural border in biology (Kohler,
2002, xiii). Or recall studies of variation in natural populations of
the snail Cepaea nemoralis, in England (Cain & Sheppard, 1950) and
France (Lamotte, 1959). Examples could be multiplied, as Endler
(1986) does in a table presenting 140 “Direct Demonstrations of
Natural Selection” (Table 5.1, 129e153). In all of this, natural pop-
ulations are simultaneously assumed, abstracted, constructed, and
investigated by those doing fieldwork and interested in natural
processes.
To summarize, theoretical, laboratory, and natural populations
are each important and can be distinguished (see Table 1). To say
that these types of population can be distinguished is not to say
that they cannot also be integrated. It is often necessary to invoke
multiple types of population in the course of a single inquiry.
2. Reifying populations
We now turn to three examples of the ways in which distinct
types of population can be conflated, and ways of avoiding such
conflations. First, as population geneticists since Sewall Wright
have recognized, it would be a mistake to conflate the census size,
Nc, of a natural population with its “effective” population size.
Second, we examine Neyman et al.’s (1956) study of competition in
two Tribolium species, indicating where there might be slippage
between theoretical and laboratory populations, and why in-
ferences from one to the other cannot be automatically justified.
Finally, in turning to Structure analyses, we show how a tool that
works perfectly well for identifying certain kinds of theoretical
populations can fail to ground claims about natural populations.
2.1. Distinguishing theoretical from natural populations via
“effective population size”
A concept that is clarified by our distinction of theoretical, lab-
oratory, and natural populations is “effective population size.”
Effective population size highlights, in the semantics of the very
term, translations that researchers must make between statements
about natural and theoretical populations.and the field: Three kinds of populations in scientific practice, Studies
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Table 1
Key contrasts among theoretical, laboratory, and natural populations.
Theoretical population Laboratory population Natural population
Core definition Groups of abstracted individuals (or genes)
studied in formal models
Collections of actual organisms assembled
in an experimental setting
Collections of actual organisms
living in the wild
Worlds studied All conceivable worlds All materially possible worlds Actual world
Article examples WrighteFisher model populations Park’s Tribolium Darwin’s finches
R.G. Winther et al. / Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences xxx (2015) 1e10 5As evidenced by the example of Fisher detailed above, a century
ago evolutionary genetics was primarily a theoretical discipline.
With little genetic data, evolutionary geneticists studied the ways
in which evolution unfolds in theoretical populations (Haldane,
1964; Lewontin 1974). As more genetic data have become avail-
able, evolutionary genetics has become more empirical. Contem-
porary evolutionary geneticists study genome-wide data from both
laboratory and natural populations. Evolutionary geneticists have
thus needed methods for translating insights between their rich
theoretical heritage and their current empirical genomic pursuits.
Effective population size is one such bridging method.
Early evolutionary geneticists studied, and contemporary
evolutionary geneticists still study, theoretical populations with
properties such as the following (Ewens, 2009; Hartl & Clark, 1989;
Hedrick, 2005; Kliman, Sheehy, & Schultz, 2008; Nielsen & Slatkin,
2013; Winther, 2006a):
1. Mating is random.
2. The number of individuals that breed remains constant across
generations.
3. The members of the population are hermaphroditic.
4. Every individual has the same expected reproductive success.
On the basis of her interests, the theorist might relax some of these
assumptions or add other assumptions.7 The chosen assumptions
lead to insights about the idealized theoretical populations. For
example, the WrighteFisher model starts from the assumptions in
1e4 and an additional assumption about the variance in offspring
number among individuals. It ignores population structure, muta-
tion, selection, two sexes, unequal numbers of breeding individuals
across generations, and other non-idealized properties (e.g., Ewens,
2009, equation (35); Gillespie, 2004, 47 ff.; Hartl & Clark, 1989, 66
ff.). Under the WrighteFisher model, one can determine the rate at
which genetic drift occurs. By adding more assumptions about
mutation and selection, one can go further, determining, for
example, the expected heterozygosity of the population (a mea-
surement of genetic diversity) or the approximate probability that
all individuals in the population will eventually carry a naturally
selected allele.
The size of a theoretical population affects its evolution. For
example, other things equal, the larger the WrighteFisher popu-
lation, the less the influence of drift, the greater the influence of
selection, and the greater the expected heterozygosity. Early re-
searchers also noticed that deviations from assumptions 1e4 can
affect the evolution of a theoretical population in many of the same
ways as can changing the size of the population. For example,
modifying assumption 3 so that the population consists of unequal
numbers of breeding females and males decreases the heterozy-
gosity in the same way as decreasing the population size. Sewall7 When considering data, the researcher might be forced to add or relax as-
sumptions because of the features of her data. For example, she might have data
that rule out the possibility that mating is randomwith respect to traits she studies.
Our focus in this paragraph and the next one is on theory rather than empirical
work.
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relating models of theoretical populations that include different
assumptions. Whereas the census size, Nc, is the number of or-
ganisms in the population, whether in nature, the laboratory, or in
theory, a population has effective size Ne if its genetic characteris-
tics match a theoretical population meeting assumptions 1e4 with
a census size equal to Ne. Differently put, the effective population
size of a population is the size of an idealized pop-
ulationdspecifically, a WrighteFisher populationdthat would be
expected to have a value of a statistic, or a theoretical property,
identical to the one calculated or observed for the population of
interest (e.g., Crow & Kimura, 1970, 110; Hartl & Clark, 1989, 82;
Hedrick, 2005, 318-320; Li, 1955, 320e321). One can choose
different properties on which to base the correspondence of the
two populations, leading to different effective population sizes.
Ewens (2009) mentions variance, eigenvalue, and inbreeding
effective population sizes, based on these three properties of
theoretical population models. For example, the inbreeding effec-
tive population size of a population is the number of idealized in-
dividuals that, in a WrighteFisher model, would generate the same
level of inbreeding as measured in the natural population of
interest.
When evolutionary geneticists study laboratory and natural
populations empirically, they use the effective population size to
relate natural and laboratory populations to theoretical pop-
ulations. Because many natural populations do not meet the as-
sumptions of theoretical models, the effective population size is
sometimes strikingly different from the census population size. For
example, though the census population size of humans is over 7
billion, under most measures and models, the heterozygosity
effective population size of humans is roughly 10,000 (Takahata,
1993).8 The main reason for this discrepancy is the super-
exponential growth in recent human history (e.g., Keinan & Clark,
2012), possibly combined with a larger variance in offspring
number in human populations than predicted by simple population
models, such as the WrighteFisher model.
Population geneticists are keenly aware that the simple theo-
retical models, such as the WrighteFisher model, may be poor
descriptions of natural populations. Nonetheless, the focus of much
population-genetic research is to relate predictions from the
theoretical populations to natural populations. Population geneti-
cists fit theoretical population models to data from natural pop-
ulations, thereby obtaining estimates of parameters such as
migration rates, divergence times, and population sizes (e.g., Beerli
& Felsenstein, 1999; Neigel, 1997; Slatkin, 1985). One consequence
of the use of the term “effective population size” is that population
geneticists are reminded that the estimates of population sizes
obtained should not be interpreted as the actual number of in-
dividuals in the natural population. Slatkin (1991) proposed an8 This is not to suggest that the human population meets the assumptions of a
WrighteFisher model with a theoretical population size of 10,000. Rather, the
empirically observed heterozygosity of humans is approximately the heterozygosity
expected in a WrighteFisher population of size 10,000.
nd the field: Three kinds of populations in scientific practice, Studies
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of migration rates between populations.
We have already warned that conflating different types of
populations leads to confusion. The concept of effective population
size reminds evolutionary geneticists of distinctions between nat-
ural populations and different types of theoretical populations.
These distinctions help population geneticists avoid reification er-
rors among kinds of populations, but the effective population size
itself can also be reified. Messer and Petrov (2013) argue that
coalescent effective population size, which is sensitive to neutral
evolution over long time scales, has been incorrectly used by some
evolutionary geneticists as a single description of population size,
leading some researchers to ignore the dynamics of natural selec-
tion in populations whose sizes fluctuate rapidly. The example of
effective population size thus illustrates both the positive benefits
of distinguishing theoretical, natural, and laboratory populations
and the risks of not doing so.
2.2. Distinguishing theoretical from laboratory populations in the
Tribolium model
When modeling a population, one necessarily ignores some
aspects of the population in exchange for clarity about others.
Neyman et al. (1956) carefully articulated ways in which laboratory
and theoretical populations of Tribolium inform one another. As we
shall see, they found a strange experimental result. To investigate it,
they constructed a mathematical model with unrealistic assump-
tions. Some of the assumptions of this theoretical model were
empirically false, but false models may still be useful (Levins, 1966,
1968; Wimsatt 2007): their broad conclusions may still be correct,
and they may point to further experiments (e.g., Mertz, Cawthon, &
Park, 1976). In all of this, Neyman, Park, and Scott were careful to
make their assumptions clear, and to distinguish two kinds of work
and of populationsdtheoretical and laboratory.
A surprising laboratory result motivated the construction of a
theoretical model. Isolated populations of Tribolium confusum and
Tribolium castaneum were allowed to develop for 780 days in
different, carefully controlled conditions, and their populations
sizes were measured every thirty days. Because the beetles react
differently to temperature and humidity, in some environments T.
confusum became more numerous than T. castaneum, and vice-
versa. In a parallel set of experiments, the two species were
placed together in the same range of environments. In these ex-
periments with interacting populations, one species of beetle was
always eliminated. The counterintuitive result is that at a particular
temperature and humidity, the species that was most prolific on its
own was not necessarily the one that tended to prevail in compe-
tition. This consequence is surprising because it belies the expec-
tation that some single intrinsic property (e.g., “vigor”) determines
a high number of individuals in a particular environment, regard-
less of whether the species is alone or interacting with others.
As described in Neyman et al. (1956, 59e74), the theoretical
population retains only a few attributes of the original population:
1. Beetles have only one sex, there is no inter-specific variability in
“voracity.”
2. There are only two life cycle stages (edible egg and voracious
adult).
3. There is no spatial structure.
4. Tribolium activities (egg-laying, eating, and dying) are assumed
to occur according to a Markov process.
This model’s constrained notion of “population” offers the advan-
tage of mathematical tractability at the cost of further divorce from
laboratory and natural populations. In exchange for thesePlease cite this article in press as: Winther, R. G., et al., The mind, the lab,
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insights about theoretical populations:
1. The equilibrium population size in a single species is a tradeoff
between voracity (egg eating) on one hand, and egg-laying and
hatching time on the other.
2. In competition between multiple species, a species with a lower
equilibrium population may still dominate a species with a
higher equilibrium population if the former has a high enough
voracity relative to the latter.
Having described and analyzed their new, theoretical population to
come to these conclusions, they subjected some of the model’s
details to empirical scrutiny.
The assumptions of the theoretical model turned out to be
inconsistent with more detailed experiments. Specifically, under
the theoretical model, the number of eggs at a given point in time
depends only on the product of the number of beetles and the
amount of time that has passed. Ten beetles should produce the
same number of eggs in 5 h as five beetles in 10 h. Figure 8 of
Neyman et al. (1956, 73) shows that this is not so in the laboratory
population: when time is varied but the number of beetles is kept
fixed, variation in egg production is described by a line; in contrast,
when the number of beetles is varied and time is fixed, variation in
egg production is described by an exponential curve. The mathe-
matical model is too simple. The theoretical and laboratory (Fig. 1)
populations do not completely coincide. Indeed, the final section of
Neyman et al. (1956) describes failed attempts to make more
complicated theoretical models accommodating the contrary data.
Critically, this paper makes the assumptions clear in part by
permitting the reader to consciously move between levels of
abstractiondnatural population to laboratory, and laboratory
population to theoreticaldalways aware of what assumptions have
been made and what information has been lost.
2.3. How to avoid conflating theoretical with natural populations in
Structure analyses
We turn to another setting in which different kinds of pop-
ulations can be conflated. In the past 15 years, population geneti-
cists have used model-based clustering methods to assign
individual organisms to distinct statistical clusters using genetic
data (e.g., Brisbin, 2010; Falush, Stephens, & Pritchard, 2003, 2007;
Hubisz, Falush, Stephens, & Pritchard, 2009; Maples, Gravel, Kenny,
& Bustamante, 2013; Pritchard, Stephens, & Donnelly, 2000; Tang,
Coram, Wang, Zhu, & Risch, 2006). The most influential algorithm
for genetic clustering is Structure (e.g., Falush et al., 2003, 2007;
Pritchard et al., 2000). Structure analyses have been useful in un-
derstanding human genetic variation, especially as an exploratory
tool for describing patterns of genetic diversity (e.g., Friedlaender
et al., 2008; Rosenberg et al., 2002). At the same time, their use
has been controversial. Proponents of biological race concepts have
argued that the classifications resulting from Structure analyses on
human data mimic traditional race classifications and thereby
validate a biological race concept, and biological realism about race
(Sesardic, 2013; Wade, 2014; a careful defense of a biological race
concept can be found in Spencer, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015; but see
Kaplan & Winther, 2013, 2014).
How do Structure analyses fit into our trichotomy? In the orig-
inal paper describing Structure (Pritchard et al., 2000), the clusters
that the algorithm produces are called “populations.” But what kind
of populations are they? To answer the question, consider Struc-
ture’s input, model, and output. The input to Structure is genetic
data. Pritchard et al. (2000) use three examples: simulated data,
data sampled from three geographically distinct groups of Taitaand the field: Three kinds of populations in scientific practice, Studies
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2015.01.009
Fig. 2. Four populations, A, B, C, and D, with their true history.
Fig. 3. Hypothetical results of Structure clustering applied to the populations in Fig. 2.
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genetic data used by Structure might come from theoretical pop-
ulations (e.g., simulations), laboratory populations (e.g., Whiteley
et al., 2011), or natural populations. Structure uses genetic data to
estimate populations.9 That is, Structure estimates the population
membership of each organism in the sampledorganisms might be
assigned to more than one populationdand estimates the allele
frequencies in each population at each genetic locus in the dataset.
To make these estimates, Structure compares the data provided to a
model. In the model, individual organisms have only two proper-
tiesdpopulation memberships, which may be fractional, and ge-
notypes. Populations, in turn, have only two propertiesdallele
frequencies and HardyeWeinberg equilibrium (HWE).10 Roughly,
Structure finds population memberships and allele frequencies that
lead to the closest fit between the model and the provided data.
In light of our trichotomy, then, Structure clusters are estimates
of theoretical populationsdthey are the groupings that optimize
the fit between a model of a theoretical population and data, which
may come from theoretical, laboratory, or natural populations.
Pritchard et al. (2000) talk about Structure in similar terms in their
original paper, and the distinction between estimates and theo-
retical quantities is fundamental to statistics (e.g., Wasserman,
2004, page ix, Figure 1; Fisher, 1922, see below).
Treating clusters from a Structure analysis as populations with
properties that are not part of Structure’s model can lead to infer-
ential errors (Anderson & Dunham, 2008; Gilbert et al., 2012;
Putnam & Carbone, 2014; Weiss & Long, 2009; Winther, 2014b;
Winther & Kaplan, 2013). Consider four (theoretical) populations
with a true history depicted in Fig. 2. Assume the populations un-
dergo genetic drift but are not subject to natural selection (see e.g.,
Crow& Kimura,1970, chap. 8; Hartl & Clark,1989, chap. 2; Nielsen &
Slatkin, 2013, chap. 2). Also imagine that populations A and D and
their ancestral populations are very large compared with their
divergence time in generations, T1. Because allele frequencies in
large populations drift very slowly, allele frequencies will be similar
in populations A and D. However, if populations B and C are smaller,
with sizes similar to their divergence times, T2, from populations A
and D, then the allele frequencies in populations B and C will
change appreciably due to drift.
In this example, populations A and D will have similar allele
frequencies, but populations B and C will have distinct allele fre-
quencies across the genome. A Structure analysis assuming three
clusters (K ¼ 3) would likely infer the three clusters as {A þ D, B, C}
(Fig. 3). No inferential errors have been made yetdthis is the cor-
rect clustering when one considers allele frequencies alone. How-
ever, depending on one’s interests, it may make little sense to
interpret cluster {AþD} as a population that does not include B and
C. For example, if the researcher is interested in questions about
which groups of organisms freely interbreed, then the Structure
clusters do not correspond with the researcher’s purposesdA and
D do not freely interbreed and have not done so for a long time.
Shared ancestry is a fundamental component of biological taxon-
omy, but Structure does not directly inform about shared ancestry.11
Even if the researcher is interested in exactly the type of
groupings that Structure finds in data, reifying Structure clusters can
still create problems. Structure analyses find a clustering scheme in
which individuals in the same cluster have maximally similar9 In our usage, the term “population” can apply to groups at different levels of a
nested structure. Thus we call the targets of estimation in a Structure analysis
“populations” rather than “subpopulations,” even though they may be subsets of a
larger population.
10 The assumption of HWE can be relaxed; see Gao, Williamson, & Bustamante
(2007).
11 Kalinowski (2011) reaches a similar conclusion.
Please cite this article in press as: Winther, R. G., et al., The mind, the lab, a
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different genotypes. Suppose that we were to perform a Structure
analysis on data from populations B and C in the example above,
excluding populations A and D.With enough genetic data, Structure
would likely be able to distinguish between populations B and C.
But Structure’s assignments will be imperfect, and to the extent that
Structure errs, it will tend to err systematically, assigning “B-like”
individuals from population C partial membership in population B
and assigning “C-like” individuals from population B partial
membership in population C. Thus, the Structure clusters corre-
sponding to populations B and C will likely be more genetically
differentiated than the natural populations themselves. Estimates
of population parameters, such as divergence times or migration
rates, may thereby be prone to overestimating genetic differentia-
tion when Structure-inferred clusters are treated as populations. If
properties of Structure clusters are analyzed as if they were prop-
erties of natural populations, as is sometimes done (e.g., Jeong et al.,
2014), then this potential bias must be kept in mind.
In all of this, the statistical methodology cannot be faulted. It has
done just what we asked: produce groupings maximizing the fit
between data and a model of populations as groups that meet HWE
and have differing allele frequencies. If the user’s purposes extend
beyond the minimal population concept expressed by the model
underlying Structure, then the user indeed has more work to do
after running the analysisdsupporting information is needed to
make a case that a Structure cluster corresponds to the type of
entity in which the investigator is interested. Users who imbue
Structure clusters with characteristics that are not part of Structure’s
model without such supporting evidence will make confused in-
terpretations, especially vis-à-vis ecology and history.12 Weiss and
Long (2009) write that “architects of structure. are well aware of
the limitations of the method and state them clearly in their papers
[citations suppressed]. However, applications of such programs are
often made without heeding caveats or recognizing the limitations
of the underlying models with respect to the questions and data at
hand.” (704) Weiss and Long are concerned with scientists reifying
the output of Structure and similar programs, and they give12 Putnam & Carbone (2014) consider similar issues from a more technical point of
view.
nd the field: Three kinds of populations in scientific practice, Studies
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13 Kaplan, Pigliucci, & Banta (2015) effectively practice assumption archaeology in
the “Gould on Morton” debate by carefully diagnosing the implicit questions and
presuppositions at stake in this controversy.
14 Similar statements could be made about Karl Pearson, as one of the anonymous
reviewers of this article pointed out.
15 On the history of “representative sampling,” see Kruskal & Mosteller (1980),
replete with instructive diagrams for nine different meanings of the term. Inter-
estingly, we have thus far been unable to find a history of the “population” concept
in statistics.
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occur when the media report on Structure analyses. For example,
science journalist Nicholas Wade (2014, 100) describes a Structure
analysis by Tishkoff et al. (2009) as revealing “14 different ancestral
groups.” Our hypothetical example above points to one way in
which a Structure-inferred cluster might not even approximately
represent an “ancestral group.”
In these cases, philosophical reflection might benefit scientific
practice by demanding clarity about the aims and nature of the
study, the kind of population(s) used in the study, and which in-
ferences the populations used can legitimately support. Philo-
sophical attention could prevent the inappropriate use of methods
for questions they were not designed to answer. Keeping in mind
our trichotomy of population types is not the only way to draw
attention to these issues and avoid reification errors, but it is one
way.
In this section, we have considered three examples of biological
practice in light of our distinction between theoretical, natural, and
laboratory populations.We viewed the effective population size,Ne,
as a bridge between theoretical and natural populations, with the
word “effective” serving as a helpful reminder that such a bridge is
being crossed. Thomas Park’s work on Triboliumwas a case study in
the successful use of multiple types of population in the same line
of inquiry. Park and his collaborators, Neyman and Scott, made their
assumptions explicit each time they used a new type of population.
We also saw that distinguishing theoretical, laboratory, and natural
populations can help researchers avoid incorrect inferences when
interpreting model-based genetic clustering results.
3. Conclusion
Themain thrust of this paper has been to distinguish three kinds
of populationsdtheoretical, laboratory, and natural. We have
focused on scientific practice and have side-stepped several phil-
osophical concerns, including realism and anti-realism, the
concepteworld relation, and the general ontology of science. In
concluding, we mention three ways in which our analysis is related
to larger themes in philosophy of science, and briefly consider the
application of our trichotomy to statistics.
First, we are not committed to any particular ontological posi-
tion about populations. Populations have been considered from
realist (e.g., Millstein, 2009, 2010, 2015), and pragmatic (e.g.,
Gannett, 2003) perspectives. To our knowledge, no fictionalist ac-
count of populations has been offered (for fictionalism see Frigg,
2010; Godfrey-Smith, 2009a; Toon, 2010; cf. Weisberg, 2013). Our
trichotomy might fit comfortably in such a fictionalist account.
Theoretical populations could be viewed as fictional objects,
worthy of study for their own sake, despite their imperfect corre-
spondence with objects in nature, viz., natural populations. Labo-
ratory populations might be seen as having characteristics of both
fictional and material objects. Our analysis of scientific practice is
potentially consistent with realist, pragmatic, and fictionalist
ontological perspectives.
Second, our trichotomy can be viewed as a tool for assumption
archaeology, the attempt to study the system of assumptions un-
derlying a family of scientific models and theories (Godfrey-Smith,
2009b; Servedio et al., 2014; Winther, 2014b, Under contract).
Which kinds of assumptions are at play in modeling and theorizing,
including methodological and ontological assumptions (Elwick,
2012; van Fraassen, 1980; Hacking, 2002; Kuhn, 1970; Levins &
Lewontin, 1985; Wimsatt 2007)? What are the functions of each
assumption, and what happens when we replace a given assump-
tion, or add new ones? Which mistaken inferences could be drawn
when we forget that certain assumptions have been made? Many
working scientists consider such questions carefully. We saw thatPlease cite this article in press as: Winther, R. G., et al., The mind, the lab,
in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences (2015), hNeyman, Park, and Scott analyzed their assumptions in an explicit
and sustained manner, using a scheme similar to our trichotomy to
understand their subject.13
Third, the concept of “population” in ecology and evolution is a
potentially useful case study of model, concept, and ontology
pluralism in science (Cartwright, 1999; Dupré, 1993; Giere, 2006;
Kitcher, 2001; Levins, 1966, 1968, 2006; Longino, 2002, 2013;
Winther, 2006c, 2014a). At least sometimes, complex phenomena
can be understood as involving multiple properties, objects, and
processes, and can be viewed from several perspectives. For
instance, Thomas Park interfaced theoretical and laboratory pop-
ulations. Moreover, we can learn about one type of population
without having to say something about another. For example,
theoretical populations need not describe all aspects of natural
populations in order to provide insight. Consider also that careful
users of Structure compare Structure results with a plurality of other
kinds of evidence related to their interests and concerns.
We have focused on evolutionary biology and ecology, but our
analysis of populations may be applicable to other fields. There is a
historical reason for thinking this is so: one of the developers of the
theoretical population concept in biology, R. A. Fisher, also
contributed to the “population” concept in statistics.14 Fisher
baptized the distinction in statistics between population and sam-
ple. Already in the first section of Fisher (1922), he faulted previous
researchers for
apply[ing] the same name, mean, standard deviation, correlation
coefficient, etc., both to the true value which we should like to
know, but can only estimate [i.e., parameters or population
moments], and to the particular value at which we happen to
arrive by our methods of estimation [i.e., estimates or sample
moments]. (1922, 311)
The population-sample distinction became fundamental to statis-
tics. Fisher also states that statisticians proceed by “by constructing
a hypothetical infinite population, of which the actual data are
regarded as constituting a random sample15” (1922, 311). In
addressing the basic problems of statistics (specification, estimation,
and distribution 1922, 313), Fisher repeatedly appeals to infinite and
hypothetical populations.
Are populations in statistics natural, laboratory, or theoretical?
In their introductory textbook, Freedman, Pisani, and Purves define
a statistical population as a class of individuals about which an
investigator wants to generalize (1998, 333). When introducing
students to statistical populations, some textbooks use natural
populations as an illustration. For example, Whitlock and Schluter
(2015) give examples of populations for use in data analysis,
including “all the individuals of voting age in Australia,” and “all
paradise flying snakes in Borneo” (4e5). Indeed, sometimes these
groups are the targets of researchers’ interests: election analysts
want to know how actual voters will vote. But to make inferences,
statisticians invoke theoretical models of the populations in which
they are interested. Sometimes the features of these models are
tightly tethered to known features of the natural or laboratory
populations under study, and sometimes the models contain
features that are harder to verify. Either way, broad classes ofand the field: Three kinds of populations in scientific practice, Studies
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2015.01.009
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duresdwarrant claims about natural or laboratory populations to
the extent that theoretical models reflect important features of the
population of interest. There is a close analogy between this “sta-
tistical population” strategy and Fisher’s strategy in mathematical
population genetics.
It is natural to see Fisher’s statistical population concept as an
extension of his theoretical population concept. Individual ele-
ments are idealized, abstracted, generalized, and made inter-
changeable in exchange for the ability to make claims about the
aggregate. Through Fisher’s influence on statistics, theoretical
populationsdand questions about their relationship to natural and
laboratory populationsdexist in the inferential machinery of many
fields across the natural and social sciences.Acknowledgements
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